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Why Do Firms Behave Similarly?
A Study on New Product Introduction in the Japanese Soft-drink Industry
Abstract
We analyze new product introduction in the Japanese soft-drink industry to distinguish among theories
of why firms exhibit similar behavior. Some theories suggest that firms mimic others with comparable resource
endowments in order to mitigate rivalry or to minimize risk.  Other theories suggest that imitation economizes on
information costs. 
In the Japanese soft-drink industry, there is often bunching of new product introductions and imitation
of competitors’ offerings.  As a result, Japanese beverage manufacturers duplicate each other’s product lines.  In
the US, by comparison, the extent of such duplication is much less.
The empirical results provide support for both sets of theories, but in different contexts.  The analysis of
firms’ initial entry into brand-new products suggests that firms enter when they observe larger competitors doing
so. Entry by large firms provides information that demand for the product is likely to grow; indeed, such entry may
give legitimacy to the product and stimulate consumer demand.  On the other hand, the analysis of new product
introduction within established product categories suggests that firms often mimic competitors that share a similar
resource base.  One interpretation is that the bunching of entry into emerging product markets is largely the result
of economizing on information costs, whereas the bunching of product introductions within established categories
is caused more by competitive interaction among similar firms.
 Key Words:  Behavioral similarity, New product introduction, Competitive interaction
1 These phenomena are observed not only in Japan but also in the world.  See Greve (1996) and Kennedy (1997).
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1.Introduction
Competitors often imitate the actions of rivals.  Such behavior can be observed worldwide
in many industries, but it is one of the most prominent characteristics of Japanese firms.  The list of
Japanese anecdotes is endless: immediate imitation of successful new products, diversification into
similar business areas, and simultaneous capacity and foreign direct investment (Tsurumi, 1976;
Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Itami, 1989; Shintaku, 1994; Cooper 1995)1.  Until the 1980s it was
2 Other behavioral characteristics of Japanese firms are orientation toward long-term survival, internal resource
accumulation (Kagono et al., 1985), and growth preference (Odagiri, 1992), the mechanisms of which have been
studied.
3 Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1988. In spite of the title, it is argued that Japanese copycat is not cultural or
genetic, but that Japanese (patent) system encourages the firms to borrow from others.
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believed that such characteristics may have contributed to Japan’s economic success.  In the 1990s,
however, Japanese firms have begun to reconsider their behavior, given pressures imposed by the
economic downturn and intensive global competition.  To evaluate the behavioral characteristics of
Japanese firms, it is necessary to understand the underlying causes and mechanisms.  Except for a few
recent empirical studies (Asaba and Lieberman, 1997; Miyagawa et al., 1997; Asaba, 1998) the causes
of similar behavior among competitors have not been systematically investigated2.
Similar behavior among rivals is often called “YOKONARABI” with a negative meaning.
Japanese firms with such a characteristic are regarded as copycats and criticized for a lack of
creativity3.  At least in some Japanese industries, however, this type of behavior seems to promote
competition i  the industries and capabilities of the firms.  Japanese firms consider that being behind
their rivals is a more serious risk than incurringa deficit and always monitor each other (Abegglen
and Stalk, 1985).  If one firm succeeds, the others immediately find the source of the success, and
imitate and follow it.  Moreover, for fear of being caught up by their rivals, firms try to innovate and
improve their ways to go slightly ahead of the competitors.  
There are several theories of why firms exhibit similar behavior, which can be broadly
classified into two categories.  The first set of theories argues that firms adopt similar behavior
because of competitive interaction.  As the studies of resource-based view of the firm suggest, firms
are constrained by their resource endowments (Collis, 1991; Teece et al., 1997).  Thus, firms can
mimic others when they have comparable resource endowments.  At the same time, resource
homogeneity means that any firms do not have distinctive competitive advantage and they face intense
competition (Peteraf, 1993).  Therefore, firms with similar resource endowments have to mimic
others to minimize the risk of asymmetry of competitive position (Knickerbocker, 1973) or to
mitigate rivalry, as the studies on strategic groups (Porter, 1979) and multimarket contact (Karnani
and Wernerfelt, 1985; Bernheim and Whinston, 1990: Gimeno and Woo, 1996) predict.
Theories in the second category argue that mimicry economizes on information costs.
Sociological studies on mimetic isomorphism (Hawley, 1986; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and
economic theories on herd behavior (Baherjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; 1998; Scharfstein
and Stein, 1990; Palley, 1995) argue that firms under uncertainty mimic others instead of collecting
information by themselves.
The purpose of this paper is to distinguish among theories of why firms exhibit similar
behavior, taking new product introduction in the Japanese soft-drink industry as an example.  In the
Japanese soft-drink industry, new product introductions occur frequently and are an important form
of competitive behavior.  New product introductions are often imitated quickly by competitors.  As
a result, Japanese beverage manufacturers duplicate each other’s product lines. In the US, by
comparison, the extent of such duplication is much less.
The Japanese soft-drink manufacturers differ greatly in size and industry origin.  The manufacturers
include not only beverage specialists but also diversified firms from other industries such as beer,
4 Based on the author’s interview. Note that new product introductions include new package sizes as well as new
flavors and formulas.
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food, milk, pharmaceutical, and so on.  The first set of theories on similar behavior predicts that firms
tend to mimic similar rivals, while the second predicts that they tend to follow informative rivals.  This
paper tries to distinguish the theories by examining what kinds of firms adopt similar behavior with
whom in their new product introductions.
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In the next section, we point out the characteristics
of the Japanese soft-drink industry, making some comparisons with the US.  Next, we briefly review
the theories on why firms adopt similar behavior and propose several hypotheses that allow for
distinction among the theories.  Data and methods are described in section 4, and the results are
reported in section 5.  Finally, we interpret the results and draw conclusions.
2.Japanese Soft Drink Industry 
2.1. Frequent introduction of new products 
In this study we focus on new product introduction by Japanese soft-drink manufacturers. 
We select the Japanese soft-drink industry for several reasons.  First, the Japanese soft-drink
industry has grown rapidly, with high rates of new product introduction.  Firms in the industry
have created and expanded numerous new product categories such as RTD (ready-to-drink)
coffee, RTD tea, sports drink, flavored water, and so on.  Many marketers from Asia and Europe
have visited Japan to observe the trend of the Japanese soft-drink market.  Second, there is an
industrial journal that gives us comprehensive data on new product introduction in the Japanese
soft-drink market. 
In the soft-drink industry, new product introduction is a very important type of
competitive behavior.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, an average of 980 new soft drink
products were introduced annually in Japan, as compared with approximately 700 in the United
States (Tollison et al., 1986).  In the case of Asahi Beverage, the fifth largest manufacturer in
Japan, its product line includes about 170 items, including 40 new products added annually.4  
Frequent new product introductions are requested in Japan by distribution channels,
especially convenience stores, which account for about one-third of soft drink sales.  To increase
their sales, convenience stores ask soft-drink manufacturers to introduce new products, which the
manufacturers advertise more than existing products.  Since several convenience stores started
expanding their stores aggressively in the mid-1980s, the categories of soft drinks have
proliferated.  As convenience stores change the product assortment on their shelves in March and
in September, many new products are introduced in those two months. 
Japanese beverage manufacturers also have their own vending machines, which account
for an additional one-third of total sales.  In order to fill the machines with their own products,
they have to offer many items.  However, they do not have to hold about 1,000 items because a
vending machine can hold at most 20 items.  In the US, by comparison, soft-drink vending
machines are a less important distribution channel.  Moreover, smaller US manufacturers can
distribute their products through the bottlers of Coca-Cola and Pepsi.  Therefore, they have little
5 Based on Table 1, we have a product line vector for each firm, which has 10 elements taking the value 1 or 0. 
Then, we calculate the angle (q) b tween each pair of vectors.  If two firms have the same product line, cos q has
the maximum value, which is equal to 1, and it decreases as the product lines of two firms become different. The
average value of cos q is much larger in Japan (0.87) than in the US (0.41).
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incentive to hold many items.
2.2. Product line duplication and bunching of product introduction
Table 1 shows the strong tendency of soft drink manufacturers to duplicate each other’s
product lines in Japan, as compared with such practices in the United States.  The table denotes
the offerings of the ten largest Japanese and US firms for 10 selected products that are available in
both countries.  The numbers in the table are 1 if the firm sells the product and 0 if the firm does
not.  
Coca Cola, the largest soft drink producer (in both countries), offers all 10 of the products
in Japan.  The table shows that seven of Coke’s Japanese competitors maintain overlap with Coke
in at least nine of the product categories, and one firm (Pepsi) overlaps in seven categories. Only
one of the top Japanese producers, Otsuka Pharmaceutical, has avoided extensive duplication of
competitors’ lines.  
In the US market by comparison, Coke and Pepsi have largely duplicated each other’s products,
but the other eight soft drink firms remain more specialized with little product overlap.  Thus,
except for the top two producers, there is little evidence that US soft drink firms have sought to
mimic each other’s product lines.  We further quantified the extent of product line duplication by
computing distance measures; the results imply that duplication was more than twice as prevalent
in Japan than in the US.5
New products are introduced frequently in Japan, and fashions change every year.  A
typical example from the 1980s is honey drinks.  Nisshin Seiyu, (a producer of edible oils, with a
small beverage business) introduced the first drink of this type, “HACHIMITSU DORI” (honey
street), in 1985.  The product slowly gained popularity; however, once Suntory introduced
“HACHIMITSU LEMON” (honey lemon) in 1986, many firms followed.  In 1989, 28 firms
introduced this kind of product, and sales of honey drinks grew by 500% from the previous year. 
Figure 1 shows the rate at which firms entered the market for honey drinks over time.  Other
product categories such as canned RTD coffee, woo long tea, Japanese tea, canned RTD black
tea, small bottled functional drink, and flavored water also came into fashion and attracted many
firms.
3.Theories and Hypotheses 
4.3.1. Theories of competitive interaction
Introduction of similar products, or similar behavior among rivals in general, may be a
common response toward the same environmental shock.  However, firms with completely
different resource endowments might not be able to behave similarly even if they face the same
environment.  This is because strategy is constrained by, and dependent on, the current level of
6 Motta (1994) gives a game theoretic explanation for this “follow-the-leader” or “bunching” of foreign
investments. 
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resources, as many scholars of resource-based view of the firm point out (Collis, 1991; Teece et
al., 1997).  Therefore, firms may be able to mimic others only when their resource endowments
are comparable. 
On the other hand, when firms with comparable resource endowments compete with each
other, the competition should be very intense, because rent can be easily eroded without resource
heterogeneity (Peteraf, 1993).  Some firms may choose to differentiate their resources and market
position from those of competitors; however, pursuing such a strategy is often difficult and risky. 
Other firms may find themselves locked in competition with similar rivals.  In such situations, if
firms do not respond to moves by rivals, competitive balance can be lost, and firms expose
themselves to the risk of deterioration of their competitive position.
Thus, it is often argued that firms adopt similar behavior to minimize risk.  Examining
bandwagon effects in foreign direct investment of US firms, Knickerbocker (1973) argues that
under the uncertain circumstances, matching each other’s moves minimizes risk.  As far as rivals
match with each other, none of them would be better or worse off.  From the point of matching
firms, this strategy guarantees that their competitive capabilities would remain roughly in balance.6 
Abegglen and Stalk (1985) point out that Japanese firms make every effort not to be behind. 
Cooper (1995) also argues that Japanese lean enterprises cannot differentiate themselves from
their rivals because of the mechanisms of rapid technological diffusion; therefore they have to
adopt a “confrontation” strategy.  These arguments suggest that behavioral similarity among
Japanese firms stems from risk-minimization.
When resource homogeneity causes intense competition, firms might try to mitigate
rivalry.  According to the studies on strategic groups, firms within the same strategic group
behave similarly (Caves and Porter, 1977; Newman, 1978; Porter, 1979).  This is because
“Divergent strategies reduce the ability of the oligopolists to coordinate their actions tacitly …
reducing average industry profitability” (Porter, 1979, P. 217).  In other words, firms within the
same strategic group adopt similar strategy to constrain competition and to keep tacit collusion.
The theory of multiple point competition suggests that multimarket contact (a
consequence of one type of similar behavior) between two firms will reduce the intensity of
rivalry, because the opportunities for cross-market retaliation increase (Karnani and Wernerfelt,
1985; Bernheim and Whinston, 1990: Gimeno and Woo, 1996).  Based on the theory, firms
duplicate each other’s product lines to mitigate competition.  Klemperer (1992) also shows that if
firms offer identical product ranges, each consumer purchases from one firm only because of costs
of using additional suppliers, so the market may be less competitive.
3.2. Theories of information costs and legitimacy
Organization theory gives another explanation for behavioral similarity, that is,
institutional isomorphism.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that rational actors make their
organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them.  This process of homogenization is
best captured by the concept of isomorphism.  Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces
7 Using the concept of mimetic isomorphism, Fligstein (1985) explains the widespread adoption of the
multidivisional structure by firms, and Haveman (1993) explains the parallel diversification patterns of California
savings and loan associations.
8 Using such theories, Zhang (1997) theoretically studies on strategic delay and cascade of investment.  Kennedy
(1997) empirically examines prime-time television program introduction, and shows that there is strategic
imitation in this industry.
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one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions
(Hawley, 1986). 
Mimetic isomorphism is the process that organizations model themselves on other
organizations when the environment is uncertain.  Mimetic behavior is rational because it
economizes on search costs when faced with uncertainty (Cyert and March, 1963).7  Mimetic
behavior also gives legitimacy to mimicking organizations.  It is often pointed out that managers
are seldom fired for making the same mistake as their rivals, but they are badly blamed for their
mistake when their rivals do the correct thing (Lieberman, 1987).  This is because the manager
gets legitimacy by making the same decision as others.
Recently, economists are also interested in imitative behavior or herd behavior.  The
studies are broadly classified into two types.  One type of argument is about information cascades
(Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992).  Suppose each agent has his own private information
about the state of nature.  An agent behaves based on his prior belief, however his behavior
reveals his private information to followers.  This information then causes the followers to change
their prior beliefs.  As the revealed information is accumulated, the followers can ignore their own
information and mimic the observed behavior.
The second type of argument is about manager’s behavior evaluated by the market.  There
are superior and inferior managers who have private information about investment.  Managers are
evaluated based on their investment behavior and the ex post performance.  The market does not
know the type of each manager, but know that superior managers have the same information. 
Therefore, in order to be evaluated as a superior type, the inferior managers ignore their own
information and imitate others (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Palley, 1995).8
3.3. Hypotheses
The product line comparisons in Table 1 suggests that Japanese manufacturers behave
more similarly than their US counterparts.  Using data on product introductions, we performed a
series of tests to distinguish among the theories that might explain the similarity of behavior
among the Japanese soft-drink manufacturers.  These tests, which identify the characteristics of
firms that are followed in the market, are based on the following hypotheses.
First of all, we have a general hypothesis that firms tend to introduce new products when
other firms do.  The competitive explanation predicts this because all firms compete with each
other in the soft-drink market.  The informational explanation also predicts this because early
movers give some information about the market.  Moreover, following prior movers might pick
up the effect of a simple common response to external shock.  Therefore, we have a basic
hypothesis (H1) that firms adopt similar behavior as others in the market.
H1: The likelihood that a firm introduces a new product in a product category is
9 Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) find that smaller firms follow larger firms to increase their capacity in the US chemical
industries.
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positively related to the number of new products in the product category recently
introduced by the other firms.
Some researchers argue that there is heterogeneity of interorganizational influences
(Strang and Tuma, 1993; Greve, 1995, 1996; Gimeno et al., 1998; Bikhchandani et al., 1992); all
early movers are not influential for all late movers.  Some early movers may be more influential,
and some late movers may be more susceptible to influence.  This occurs partly because firms
regard different firms as their rivals and reference groups (Porac et al., 1995; Fiegenbaum et al.,
1996).  
Japanese soft-drink manufacturers can be characterized in several ways.  One important
characteristic is the relative rank of the firm.  In this study, firms are ordered based on their total
sales in the soft-drink market, and divided into ranks of “top five,” “top ten,” etc.  The arguments
on competitive interaction predict that large and small firms behave differently and therefore
would be unlikely to follow each other.  On the other hand, theories on information cascades
predict that larger firms are more likely to be followed because the behavior of larger firms is
regarded as being of higher informational quality.  High-status firms, which are worthwhile to be
imitated, promote mimetic processes (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997).  They are “fashion leaders” in
several cases (Bikhchandani, et al., 1998) 9  Therefore, the information-based theories lead to the
hypothesis that firms are more likely to mimic others in higher ranks.
H2: The likelihood that a firm introduces a new product in a product
category is positively related to the number of new products in the product
category introduced by the other firms in higher ranks.
On the other hand, the competitive arguments predict similar behavior among the firms in
the same rank.  Firm size is an important measure of firm capabilities and the firms of similar sizes
are direct rivals (Porac et al, 1995).  If a firm does not respond to the moves of others with similar
size, the firm might lose its competitive position.  Therefore, competitive arguments predict that
firms in the same rank are more likely to adopt similar behavior.  
H3: The likelihood that a firm introduces a new product in a product
category is positively related to the number of new products in the product
category introduced by the other firms in the same rank.
Another important characteristic of the Japanese soft-drink manufacturers is their industry
of origin.  Some firms deal with soft drinks only, but others are from the industries of beer, food,
confectionery, milk, and so on.  Firms from the same origin should have similar resource
endowments and would regard each other as rivals.  Therefore, the theory of competitive
interaction predicts that firms from the same origin behave similarly.  
H4: The likelihood that a firm introduces a new product in a product
category is positively related to the number of new products in the product
8category introduced by the other firms from the same origin.
Firms from the same origin also have similar frames of reference, so the informational
explanation is also consistent with this hypothesis.  However similar firms are not the only
information sources.  Indeed, larger firms are likely to be more informative, as discussed earlier. 
Therefore, we expect that the “origin effect” would be weaker than the “larger firm effect” if the
informational explanation holds.  
In summary, competitive explanations predict that firms adopt similar behavior with
similar firms, while informational explanations predict that firms behave similarly with informative
firms.  Thus, support for H2 would agree with predictions derived from informational
explanations, while support for H3 or H4 would agree with the predictions derived from
competitive explanations. 
5.Data and Variables
6. The primary data in this paper are for new product introductions by the
Japanese beverage manufacturers between 1985 and 1991.  We collected the data from the
industrial journal, Beverage Japan, which annually reports the new products in the previous
year by product categories, by firms, and by months.  All Japanese manufacturers that
introduced more than 10 new soft drink products during the observation period were identified
and included in the sample.  We estimated new product introduction by using a logit model in
which the probability that a firm introduces a new product at each moment of time is taken to
be a linear function of independent and control variables.  
We performed this logit analysis on two data sets which differ in their degree of product
aggregation.  The first data set is at the level of individual products; the second is at the more
aggregate level of product categories. The first data set covers 10 specific products for which we
were able to collect historical data going back to the very first introduction of the product by any
firm in Japan. 
Table 2 lists the names of the products and product categories in these two data sets.  A product
category, such as canned coffee, contains a number of product types (e.g., black coffee, caf au
lait, non-sugar coffee, and premium coffee).  The product types can be further broken down
(primarily on the basis of package size and type) to yield specific products.  For example, the
product,  anned premium coffee is included in the first data set, while  anned coffee, is one of the
categories in the second, more aggregate data set. 
4.1. Data Set on New Products
We identified 10 products with historical data going back to the very first introduction by
any firm in Japan.  With monthly observations covering 48 firms, this data set includes 40896
observations.  The introduction patterns for the 10 products are shown in Figures 1-10.  
The analysis of this data set focuses on the date of first introduction of the product by
each firm.  The dependent variable, yi,k,s,t, was set equal to 1 for all observations where firm i
introduced for the first time the specific new product, k during the observation month s in year t.
Note that this dependent variable can be 1 only once.  (The dependent variable in the second data
set can be 1 many times, because one firm may introduce slightly different new products in the
10 Author’s interview with marketing personnel in several Japanese beverage manufacturers.
11 The largest 20 firms in the Japanese soft-drink market are listed in Production and Sales Share in the Alcoholic
Liquors and Food Industries, Nikkan Keizai Tsushin-sha.  The rank is quite stable during the observation period. 
12 The source of the data is Production and Sales Share in the Alcoholic Liquors and Food Industries, each year.
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same product category repeatedly.) 
The measures used to test the four hypotheses are based on the rates of new product introduction
by other firms in the sample during the prior six months.  We adopted a six-month window
because it takes up to six months for a firm to imitate a new product introduced by other firms.10 
The first explanatory measure, OTHERSi,k,s,t, is the number of other firms that introduced
the specific new product, k, during the previous six months of the observation month s n year t.
Hypothesis 1 implies a positive sign for this variable.  
As pointed out previously, OTHERS might pick up a simple common response to external
shock.  Therefore, we constructed additional explanatory variables that reflect firm characteristics. 
By estimating the models with such variables as well as OTHERS, we can control for any
common response of firms.
We constructed three measures that reflect firm characteristics.  First, the variable,
ORIGINi,k,s,t is the average number of other firms from the same origin as the observation firm,
which introduced the specific new product, k, during the previous six months of the observation
month s in year t.  The firms in the sample are classified into seven origins, Alcohol, Beverage,
Confectionery, Foods, Milk, Tea/Coffee, and Other, as shown in Table 3.  Hypothesis 4 implies
that ORIGIN will have a positive coefficient.
Second, the variable, RANKi,k,s,t is the average number of other firms in the same rank as
the observation firm, which introduced the specific new product, k, during the previous six
months of the observation month s in year t.  The firms in the sample are classified into four ranks
based on the sales in the whole soft drink market11.  The largest five firms are classified into the
rank, TOP5.  The sixth through the tenth largest firms are classified into the rank, TOP10.  The
eleventh through the twentieth larg st firms are classified into the rank, TOP20.  The firms beyond
top twenty are classified into the rank, UNDER20.  Given hypothesis 3, the expected sign of the
coefficient is positive.
Third, we constructed the variable, TOP5k,s,t, which is defined as the average number of
(other) firms in the rank of TOP5, which introduced the specific new product, k, during the
previous six months of the observation month s in year . Hypothesis 2 implies a positive
coefficient for this variable.
In addition to these explanatory variables, we constructed a series of control variables.  These
include a category dummy and a month dummy.  Further control variables include measures of
market concentration, market growth, and annual average frequency of new product introduction. 
Market concentration (CR5k,t) is defined as cumulative concentration among the five largest firms
in the product category to which the specific new product, k, bel ngs in year t.12 We do not have
any expectation about the sign of the coefficient.  Market growth (GROWk,t) is defined as follows, 
GROWk,t = Qk,t / Qk,t-1,
where Qk,t is the shipment for product category to which the specific new product, k, belongs in
13 The shipment data are collected either from Production and Sales Share in the Alcoholic Liquors and Food
Industries, Nikkan Keizai Tsushin-sha or Beverage Japan.
14 To avoid an identification problem, we took the average during observation periods except for the year t.
15 The data in 1985 are used to calculate independent variables, and are not included in the sample.  For one of the
11 product categories, market growth data until 1989 were not available.  Therefore, for 10 categories, we have
34,560 observations (= 10 categories * 48 firms * 6 years * 12 months), for one category, we have 1,152
observations (= 1 category * 48 firms * 2 years * 12 months), and the total number of observations is 35,712.
16 OTHERSi,j,s,t is the number of new products in the product category j introduced by the other firms during the six
months prior to the observation month s in year t.  ORIGINi,j,s,t., is the average number of new products in the
product category j introduced by the other firms from the same origin as the observation firm during the previous
six months of the observation month s in year t.  RANKi,j,s,t. is the average number of new products in the product
category j introduced by the other firms in the same rank as the observation firm during the previous six months of
the observation month s in year t.  TOP5j,s,t is defined as the average number of new products in the product
category j introduced by (other) firms in the rank of TOP5 during the previous six months of the observation
month s in year t.
17 Market concentration (CR5j,t) is defined as cumulative concentration among 5 largest firms in product category j
in year t.  Market growth (GROWj,t) is the growth rate of the product category.
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year t13.  In the study of new product introduction, the market concentration and market growth
of the category of the new product are used.  The expected sign of GROW is positive.  Finally, the
annual average frequency of new product introduction (AVEFREQi,t) is average number of new
products introduced annually by firm i among the observation years except for year t14.  This
variable controls for the fact that firms have different average rates of new product introduction.
4.2. Data Set on Product Categories 
All product categories where at least one of the manufacturers introduced new products in
any year during the observation period are included in this sample.  These criteria resulted in a
sample of 48 manufacturers in 11 product categories.  In total, we have 35,712 observations.15  
We set the binary dependent variable, yi,j,s,t equal to 1 for all observations where firm i
introduced a new product in category j during the observation month s in year t.
This dependent variable can equal 1 repeatedly for a given firm, even within a product category. 
We constructed independent variables in the same way as the product-level data set.16  Also,
category and month dummies and AVEFREQi,t were defined in the same way as in the product-
level data set.17 Table 4 provides summary statistics, including mean, standard deviation, and a
matrix of correlation coefficients for the two data sets.  
Our predictions can be summarized as follows.  If the competitive explanation such as
restriction of competition and risk minimization holds, (in other words, if firms adopt similar
behavior with similar rivals), we would see strong effects of OTHERS, ORIGIN, and RANK, but
no effect of TOP5.  On the other hand, the information-based explanation suggests that firms
adopt similar behavior with leading firms, leading to strong positive coefficients for OTHERS a d
TOP5 but weak effects of ORIGIN and RANK. 
7.Results
8. The results of the logit analysis of product introduction for the two data sets are shown
in Table 5.  While the explanatory variables are almost identical, the results should be
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interpreted differently, given that the dependent variables and level of data aggregation differ
between the data sets.  The results in the left half of the table point to factors that influence the
decision of a firm to make its first entry into a new product market, whereas the results in the
right half of the table reflect the more general decision to introduce a new product into an
established product category.  Many of the latter introductions involve relatively incremental
product changes.  Conceivably, these two types of product introduction might be influenced by
different factors, given that a firm’s first entry into a new product market is generally a more
significant and uncertain step.
5.1. Initial Entry into New Products
The results of the study on firms’ initial entry into new products are reported in the left
half of Table 5.  Model (1) includes the control variables and OTHERS only.  In this model,
OTHERS has a significantly positive coefficient.  Therefore, firms were more likely to enter a new
product market when many other firms were observed to have entered in recent months, and H1
is strongly supported.  In the case of a brand-new product, recent introduction by other firms
gives a signal that there is potential demand for the product.  However, the positive coefficient for
OTHERS does not necessarily mean that firms imitated other companies, as they might have all
been responding to the same external shock. 
In addition to OTHERS, model (2) includes TOP5, which reflects the influence of large
firms.  TOP5 is positive and highly significant, suggesting that the prior moves of larger firms
have special influence, and H2 is strongly supported.  Thus, firms tended to enter new beverage
markets when they observed that other firms were doing so, and particularly, when they observed
entry by the largest soft drink companies.
Models (3) and (4) include ORIGIN and RANK, the variables associated with the prior
moves of similar firms.  Neither of these variables is significant, indicating lack of support for
hypotheses H3 and H4 in the case of entry into new products.  Thus, firms’ initial entry into new
product markets seems not to have been influenced by the observation that other firms of similar
size or industry origin were entering.
As to the control variables, GROW and AVEFREQ have significantly positive
coefficients as expected.  CR5 is negative but insignificant.  
5.2. Introductions into Product Categories
The right half of Table 5 reports the logit analysis of firms’ decisions to introduce new
products into established product categories.  The results differ from those in the left half of the
table in a number of salient respects.  
First, the measure, OTHERS, is significantly positive in models (5) and (6), but it loses
significance in models (7) and (8) when ORIGIN and RANK are added.  The latter measures are
both positive, as predicted by hypotheses H3 and H4, although RANK is insignificant.  ORIGIN is
significant in model (7) and (8).  Therefore, after controlling for the effect of a common response
to external shock, which might be picked up by OTHERS, firms tended to introduce new products
if others from the same industry origin recently introduced products into the category, and H4 is
supported. 
Second, there is a difference in the result of TOP5, which reflects the influence of large
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firms.  TOP5 is not significant, and it appears with a negative sign.  This suggests that the prior
moves of larger firms had no special influence on decisions to introduce products into established
categories, and H2 is not supported.
The results for the control variables are mostly similar to those in the left half of the
table.  GROW has a significant and positive coefficient as expected; firms tended to introduce new
products in categories that were expanding.  CR5 is significantly negative, suggesting that firms
tended to introduce new products within product categories with lower market concentration. 
AVEFREQ is significant and positive as expected.
9.Discussion and Conclusion
This study has considered the reasons why firms may imitate their rivals.  Using data on
new product introduction by the Japanese soft-drink manufacturers, we have attempted to
distinguish among two sets of theories: those that yield similar behavior as the result of
competitive interaction, and those showing that such behavior economizes on information costs.
The empirical results provide support for both sets of theories, but in different contexts. 
The analysis of firms’ initial entry into brand-new products suggests that firms enter when they
observe larger competitors doing so. Entry by large firms provides information that demand for
the product is likely to grow; indeed, such entry may give legitimacy to the product and stimulate
consumer demand.  On the other hand, the analysis of new product introduction within established
product categories suggests that firms often mimic others from the same industry origin, who
share a similar resource base.  One interpretation is that the bunching of entry into emerging
product markets is largely the result of economizing on information costs, whereas the bunching
of product introductions within established categories is caused more by competitive interaction.
 These contrasting results are reasonable.  In the case of a brand-new product, it is
uncertain whether the product will sell well or not.  Under such a highly uncertain situation, firms
try to acquire information by looking at larger firms, which are expected to have more or better
information.  Therefore, firms are more likely to introduce a new product when they observe that
one or more of the largest five firms have done so.  In other words, larger firms are “fashion
leaders” (Bikhchandani, 1998).  
In the case of product introduction within an established product category, on the other
hand, the firm is certain that the category exists.  Rather, firms might be afraid that new product
introduction by their rival damages their position within the category or the other categories. 
Therefore, the findings suggest that clustering within product categories arises largely because
firms follow competitors with similar characteristics.
Such findings contribute to the developing literature on behavioral similarity.  While our
ability to distinguish among the alternative theories is limited in extent, this study is one of the first
to attempt to make such assessments empirically.  The theoretical literature on behavioral
similarity has grown dramatically in recent years, but there has been a dearth of empirical work. 
We hope that this early study can stimulate additional work by others. Moreover, we are
18 There are several technical problems in our analysis for which better approaches may be found.  For example,
we adopt a six-month window to count prior introduction influencing the introduction of a focal firm.  However,
even if prior moves have some positive effects on the probability of introduction of a focal firm, the focal firm does
not necessary imitate prior movers.  The firm might happen to introduce the products without imitation, or it might
actually imitate prior movers but beyond a six-month window.  We might have tried different length of window. 
Even with the results of this study, however, we can say that firms adopt (not imitate) new product introduction
similar to some kinds of other firms.
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continuing to refine the measures and tests developed here.18
 One final question is the normative implications of our findings for business firms and
more generally for society.  Such issues are complex to assess and beyond the scope of the
present paper.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the imitative behavior of firms can have a major
impact on profits (both the average level in an industry and the degree of variation among firms),
and the development of firm capabilities. Also, there are implications for the social allocation of
resources, in that firms may make redundant investments and they may invest too quickly (or too
slowly) in emerging areas, depending on bandwagon effects. 
While the negative implications of imitative behavior are often obvious, we suggest that
the competition among firms to match each other and attempt to gain a small lead often has
positive effects.  The Japanese soft-drink industry has been successfully developing.  It created
many new categories such as RTD coffee, various kinds of tea, sports drinks, and functional
drinks.  These new product categories are exported in other countries in Asia and Europe.  In the
US, on the other hand, these product categories, which have been called “new generation drinks”
and expected to grow, have not grown as much as in the Japan.  
The expansion of these categories in Japan is partly due to the competitive behavior of
bunching of product introductions.  In the process of bunching, firms advertise the brand-new
product extensively in order to lead their competitors slightly or to catch up with rivals.  Their
efforts help the new product to be perceived by consumers as a fashion.  In this process, firms
improve their products incrementally.  This improvement promotes the demand and expands the
product category.  
Therefore, similar behavior among competitors has a positive side that it promotes
competition.  The competition expands the market and strengthens the capability of individual
firms, although it might have a negative impact in some industries or it might lead to inefficient
resource allocation.  This type of behavior, when combined with creative effort, has been an
important factor in the past success of many Japanese firms.
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JAPAN Coca Otsuka Suntory Kirin Asahi Dydo UCC Pokka
Cola
Cola 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Lemon Lime 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Orange Drink 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sports Drink 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RTD Tea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
100% Juice 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
PET Bottled Water 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Flavored Water 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sparkling Fruit Drink 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RTD Coffee 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
US Coca Pepsi Dr. Pepper Seven Up Cadbury Royal A&W Monarch
Cola Schwepps Crown
Cola 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Lemon Lime 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Orange Drink 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sports Drink 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
RTD Tea 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
100% Juice 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
PET Bottled Water 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Falvored Water 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sparkling Fruit Drink 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
RTD Coffee 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

























# Product Abbreviation Obs. Period Product Category
1 Honey lemon Honey Lemon 1986-1991 None of the above
2 100% juice in a wide-mouth bottle Juice 1987-1990 Juice 100%
3 Canned straight black tea Straight Tea 1987-1992 Black Tea
4 Non-grapefruit flavor sports drink Sports 1985-1990 Sports
5 Carbonated non-juice drinks in a 350ml can Carb2 350 1986-1992 Carbo2
6 Canned Mugi-tea Mugi Tea 1984-1992 Other Tea
7 Canned green tea Green Tea 1985-1992 Other Tea
8 Canned premium coffee Coffee 1985-1991 Coffee
9 Functional drinks with Fiber Fiber Func 1988-1990 Functional
10 Water with geographical name Water 1984-1992 Water






























# Product Category Abbreviation Obs. Period
1 Canned Carbonated Drinks with less than 10% Juice Carbo1 1986-1991
2 Canned Carbonated Drinks without Juice Carbo2 1986-1991
3 Canned Coffee Coffee 1986-1991
4 Canned Black Tea Black Tea 1986-1991
5 Canned Woo Long Tea Woo Long Tea 1986-1991
6 Canned Other Tea Other Tea 1990-1991
Table 2: The List of Products and Categories
7 Sports Drinks Sports 1986-1991
8 Functional Drinks (Except for Vegetable Juice) Functional 1986-1991
9 100% Natural Juice Juice 100% 1986-1991
10 Canned Drinks with 10-50% Juice Juice 10-50% 1986-1991
11 Bottled Water Water 1986-1991
Table 2: The List of Products and Categories
# FIRM ORIGIN RANK
1 Coca Cola Beverage TOP5 (1)
2 Pepsi Beverage TOP10 (9)
3 Dydo Beverage TOP10 (6)
4 Pokka Beverage TOP10 (8)
5 Calpis Beverage TOP10 (10)
6 Cherio Beverage UNDER20
7 Sangalia Beverage UNDER20
8 Yakuruto Beverage TOP20 (12)
9 Asahi Alcohol TOP5 (5)
10 Kirin Alcohol TOP5 (4)
11 Sapporo Alcohol TOP20 (18)
12 Suntory Alcohol TOP5 (3)
13 Takara Alcohol UNDER20
14 Godo Seishu Alcohol UNDER20
15 Takeda Others UNDER20
16 SB Foods UNDER20
17 Kikkoman Foods UNDER20
18 Kanebo Foods TOP20 (13)
19 Meiji-ya Foods UNDER20
20 Ajinomoto Foods UNDER20
21 Kagome Foods TOP20 (11)
22 Yukijirushi Foods UNDER20
Table 3: The List of the Firms
23 Shiseido Foods UNDER20
24 Yamazaki-pan Foods UNDER20
25 House Foods UNDER20
26 Fujiya Confectionery TOP20 (20)
27 Meiji Seika Confectionery UNDER20
28 Morinaga Seika Confectionery TOP20 (19)
29 Lotte Confectionery UNDER20
30 Meiji Nyugyo Milk TOP20 (17)
31 Morinaga Milk TOP20 (16)
32 Takanashi Milk UNDER20
33 Yukijirushi Milk TOP20 (14)
34 UCC Tea/Coffee TOP10 (7)
35 JT Otthers UNDER20
36 Ito-en Tea/Coffee TOP20 (15)
37 Mitsui Norin Tea/Coffee UNDER20
38 Nihon Seikyo Others UNDER20
39 Zenkoku-Nokyo Others UNDER20
40 Art Coffee Tea/Coffee UNDER20
41 JR Kyushu Others UNDER20
42 Kinki Sain Beverage UNDER20
43 JR Higashi Others UNDER20
44 Maruzen-shokuhin Beverage UNDER20
45 Cadburry Beverage UNDER20
46 Nestle Tea/Coffee UNDER20
47 Prio Beverage UNDER20
48 Nagano Tomato Foods UNDER20














Y GROW CR5 AVEFREQ OTHERS ORIGIN RANK
Y 1.0000
GROW 0.0183 1.0000
CR5 -0.0118 -0.2348 1.0000
AVEFREQ 0.0258 -0.0107 0.0074 1.0000
OTHERS 0.0613 0.1424 -0.1264 -0.0259 1.0000
ORIGIN 0.0466 0.0852 -0.0760 0.0114 0.5978 1.0000
RANK 0.0456 0.0958 -0.0897 0.0524 0.6811 0.5030 1.0000
TOP5 0.0516 0.0665 -0.0236 -0.0133 0.6758 0.4072 0.4445
Mean 0.0047 0.1792 75.5704 3.7108 1.3239 0.0244 0.0251
Std Dev. 0.0682 0.2746 7.9609 2.6093 2.1722 0.0662 0.0601






Y GROW CR5 AVEFREQ OTHERS ORIGIN RANK
Y 1.0000
GROW 0.0057 1.0000
CR5 -0.0176 -0.1372 1.0000
AVEFREQ 0.1075 -0.0124 0.0042 1.0000
OTHERS 0.0492 0.0123 -0.1224 -0.0343 1.0000
ORIGIN 0.0591 0.0071 -0.0724 0.1032 0.6289 1.0000
RANK 0.0728 0.0082 -0.0898 0.2375 0.6777 0.5422 1.0000
TOP5 0.0300 0.0503 -0.0118 -0.0094 0.6721 0.4290 0.4452
Mean 0.0346 0.1801 71.7903 4.2945 9.7061 0.1770 0.1818
Std Dev. 0.1829 0.2547 10.6411 2.8899 7.4791 0.2152 0.2055
Table 4: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Initial Entry into New Products Introductions into Product Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant -8.52 -7.78 -8.52 -7.79 -4.44
(-4.59)** (-4.10)** (-4.58)** (-4.41)** (-5.77)**
GROW 1.05 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.71
(3.01)** (2.94)** (3.02)** (2.94)** (4.28)**
CR5 -5.64e-03 -0.02 -5.69e-03 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.24) (-0.74) (-0.25) (-0.74) (-3.62)**
AVEFREQ 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.19
(5.58)** (5.56)** (5.46)** (5.44)** (20.27)**
OTHERS               (H1) 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.02
(9.40)** (4.98)** (6.54)** (4.09)** (3.58)**
          TOP5           (H2) 1.56 1.56
(2.83)** (2.82)**
          RANK           (H3) -0.47 -0.64
(0.48) (-0.68)
          ORIGIN        (H4) 1.12 1.03
(1.29) (1.20)
MONTH DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
CATEGORY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 5: Logit Analysis of Product Introduction
Log Likelihood -1072.43 -1068.53 -1071.58 -1067.71 -4668.07
No of Obs. 40896 40896 40896 40896 35712
Numbers in parenthes are
t statistics.
Significance levels are
using 2-tailed test: *=5%,
**=1%.
